

Bloc Was Prepared to Crush Solidarity, a Defector Says

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WARSAW, April 16 — Soviet, Czechoslovak and East German troops were twice poised to invade Poland in the 16 months before the Polish Government crushed the Solidarity movement, according to an account by a defector from the Polish general staff.

The Polish émigré journal *Kultura*, published in Paris, has just published a long, detailed account of the time by Ryszard Kuklinski, who during that period was preparing for martial law while secretly reporting for the United States on military plans. Mr. Kuklinski, who is living somewhere in the United States now, said Soviet generals took up residence in Poland and bullied and humiliated Polish leaders into crushing the Solidarity movement by threatening a full-scale attack similar to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The defector, a former colonel, said

Troops were reportedly poised twice to invade.

that he and others in the Polish command began drawing blueprints for a martial law clampdown on Solidarity at precisely the time that Polish officials joined Lech Walesa, the union's leader, in the Gdansk shipyards to sign an agreement guaranteeing union rights and cultural freedoms.

Poles have been straining to listen to the often jammed foreign radio stations that are broadcasting the article, which covers more than 50 pages.

Jerzy Urban, the Government spokesman who first disclosed Mr. Kuklinski's existence last June, said this week that he would comment next Tuesday on the *Kultura* article, which was in the form of an interview.

Mr. Kuklinski, who was spirited out of Poland with his family a month before martial law was declared on Dec. 13, 1981, and is now under a death sentence in Poland, said in the article that he was involved in the attack on Czechoslovakia in 1968 and that those experiences led him to see a similar scenario unfolding in Poland.

Throughout the article, the 57-year-old defector, who almost certainly has undergone detailed debriefing in the United States, sought to portray himself as a patriot who was induced to spy by Moscow's heavy-handed attempts to dominate Poland and by his memories of 1970, when Polish armed forces quelled a protest against price increases by killing 44 people.

'History Began to Repeat Itself'

"When, 10 years later in 1980, history began to repeat itself, and when, again, in the name of elitist authority putting itself above nation, attempts began to be made to use armed force against the country's own workers and youth, I simply said no," he wrote. "I saw here a very typical situation in which a soldier not only does not have to but simply cannot carry out orders which are contrary to his conscience."

Mr. Kuklinski described Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, then head of the Polish Army and now the Polish leader, as often anguished and despairing, and as trying to stall while Soviet generals demanded action to suppress the stirrings for labor pluralism that they called counterrevolution.

By the winter of 1980, the defector wrote, Soviet military leaders had drawn plans for a military invasion in the guise of Warsaw Pact maneuvers. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, was in Warsaw, where, according to Mr. Kuklinski, he was seeking to put together a new Polish government chosen from pro-Soviet hard-liners. In all, the defector reported, 18 Soviet, Czechoslovak and East German divisions were to be ready to cross Polish borders on Dec. 8, while the Soviet and East German Baltic fleets were to maintain a blockade.

Jaruzelski Described as Upset

According to the account, General Jaruzelski, who was then head of the Polish Army, was deeply upset and could not even convince the Russians to eliminate from their plans the participation of East German troops, whose use he insisted would needlessly offend national pride.

At this point, Gen. Eugeniusz Molczyk, one of the hard-line generals politically arrayed against General Jaruzelski, appealed to the Soviet Defense Ministry to allow the Polish military to deal with Solidarity. The defector termed General Molczyk a "known underling of Moscow."

Mr. Kuklinski said that in the wake of the plea, but in probable consequence of strong expressions of concern from Western Europe and from the Carter Administration, the invasion plans were shelved.

Then a prolonged period began during which the secret police targeted more than 6,000 opposition figures for arrest and kept several hundred under surveillance. Meanwhile, Mr. Kuklinski wrote, the army lagged in its plans.

In the spring of 1981, the article said, with General Jaruzelski still insisting that the time was not right for a military strike, Marshal Kulikov led a

group of 30 K.G.B. and Soviet military officials to Poland to strengthen plans for martial law. The article said they demanded that mass arrests and summary trials be included.

Again that spring, at Soviet insistence, 150,000 troops took part on short notice in Warsaw Pact maneuvers that Mr. Kuklinski regarded as a possible cover for an invasion. Only 30,000 of the troops were Poles, and the non-Polish troops stayed on beyond their earlier scheduled departure. When Polish officers asked about this, Marshal Kulikov reportedly replied that "the exercises were continuing because there was counterrevolution in Poland."

Mr. Kuklinski said that Soviet command centers were set up in several Polish towns, while Soviet military reconnaissance teams scouted factories, mines and universities.

Again the threat of military force was being used, Mr. Kuklinski said, to press General Jaruzelski into signing decrees that would permit a declaration of martial law at any time. On April 13, 1981, the Polish general met Marshal Kulikov and refused to comply, the defector said.

Mr. Kuklinski's attitude toward General Jaruzelski appears somewhat ambivalent. As noted by the defector's unnamed interviewer, Mr. Kuklinski's description of the events indicates that General Jaruzelski, and even more, Stanislaw Kania, who was then Prime Minister, sought to delay martial law for as long as possible. On the other hand, Mr. Kuklinski rejects the view that by finally imposing martial law on Dec. 13, 1981, General Jaruzelski had a choice of either martial law or a much harsher and damaging Soviet invasion.

Mr. Kuklinski said he believes that from the outset there was another option: that if the Polish political and military leaders had stood up to the Russians as Wladyslaw Gomułka did in 1956 in the face of Nikita S. Khrushchev's threats of invasion, the Russians would again have backed down and the passionate Solidarity backers would have toned down their demands.

When the Polish Government first disclosed the existence of Mr. Kuklinski, Mr. Urban, the Government spokesman, said that Poles were willing to endure the embarrassment of acknowledging a spy in their high command in order to unmask the cynicism of the United States Government. Washington, he said, had not warned Solidarity about martial law though it had all the details from Mr. Kuklinski.